

only by this argument can the possibility of geometry as synthetic cognition a priori be proven. Perhaps, one of the most valuable points that Falkenstein offers is his repeated emphasis that space and time are not properties shared by some object, but are instead 'concepts of order' (pp. 183–5, 276–7).

The final section is not a culmination, but an Appendix (p. xvi) to the work, where Falkenstein draws implications from Kant's arguments – discussing such perennial problems as the 'Non-spatiality of the Things in Themselves' and 'The Unknowability Thesis and the Problem of Affection'. It may be this part that generates both the greatest interest and the greatest controversy. To take the first topic: Falkenstein suggests that taken together the *Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions* establish that 'if things in themselves are in space and time, it is in a radically different sense from that in which the matters of appearance are in space and time' (p. 309). Thus, Falkenstein believes that Kant argues successfully for a limited claim, but that he is not entitled to the stronger claim that the things in themselves are not in space and time in any sense.

As the above should clearly indicate, *Kant's Intuitionism* is not for beginners. It is not an easy book to read but that is mostly because Falkenstein has to deal with difficult material. This he does in a mostly thorough, if not always straightforward method. But it is a curious omission that he does not discuss Kant's treatment of Incongruent Counterparts. Granted it is not found in the *Critique*, but it is in the *Prolegomena* and other writings, all of which Falkenstein utilizes. It is to his credit that he argues vigorously that the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is not a patchwork of all theories that Kant kept but which were superseded by the later parts of the *Critique*. And it is also to his credit that while he is sympathetic to Kant he is also more than forthright in showing the errors and weaknesses in Kant's account. However, I think Falkenstein over-states his case when he claims that 'carelessness and lack of attention' were typical of Kant (p. 290). In being judicious, yet critical, Falkenstein follows Hans Vaihinger, who he claims was the last person to do justice to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. Vaihinger had intended to publish a commentary on the entire *Critique* but because of ill-health only published two volumes: the first on the Prefaces and Introductions (1881) and the second devoted to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' (1892). This second volume remains the standard by which all works on the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' should be judged. Falkenstein's book will not replace Vaihinger's work, but all Kant scholars should take a serious look at a worthy addition to the *Kommentar: Kant's Intuitionism*.

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The Metaphysics of Free Will

By John Martin Fischer

Blackwell, 1995. Pp. ix + 273. ISBN 1-55786-8573. £14.99.

Fischer's book provides a detailed analysis and assessment of contemporary arguments for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism (or of responsibility and God's foreknowledge, as Fischer regards these parallel arguments as on a par in their probative value). It pulls together the threads of much of his previous work on topics falling under the general heading of free will, and defends a position that he dubs 'semi-compatibilism'. The level of analysis is generally quite high, and even those (such as this reviewer) who will resist some of his

main conclusions will find Fischer's discussions insightful and fair-minded and his conclusions ably defended. It is highly recommended to specialists in the area as well as to others who want a readable and fairly comprehensive overview of the current state of discussions of the particular range of issues Fischer treats.

The main theses defended by Fischer are (i) that causal determinism (or God's foreknowledge) is incompatible with a given agent's having the ability to do other than he does in any particular circumstance, and (ii) yet determinism (or foreknowledge) is compatible with moral responsibility (and other important aspects of personhood) since the latter do not require the availability of alternative options. Hence, the label 'semi-compatibilism'. (I should note that Fischer does not explicitly endorse (i), but instead rebuts certain objections to it and concludes that it is very plausible.) At the end of the book Fischer sketches a positive account of morally responsible agency that does not require any indeterministic assumptions. I will briefly remark on each of these three main aspects of the work.

As Fischer notes, the focus of contemporary debate about the compatibility of causal determinism with 'the ability to do otherwise' concerns the validity of a modal principle which he labels 'The Transfer of Powerlessness'. (I shall here ignore the further application to God's foreknowledge.) Let $N_{st}P$ stand for 'P obtains, and agent S was not free at time t to perform any action such that were S to perform it, P would not obtain' and let ' \rightarrow ' stand for the material conditional. According to Transfer, from (1) $N_{st}P$ and (2) $N_{st}(P \rightarrow Q)$, we may infer $N_{st}Q$. (A more generalized version of this is nicely expressed in Jonathan Edward's dictum, 'those things that are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary'.) This plausible principle can be applied to the question of determinism and free will by letting 'P' stand for some complete description of the world at some time in the past and 'Q' stand for some arbitrary action that will be performed in the future. The truth of the first premise needed for applying Transfer appears to hold in virtue of 'the fixity of the past', and likewise the truth of the second premise appears to hold in virtue of 'the fixity of the laws'.

Fischer proceeds to consider two main criticisms of this argument. The first, culled from the writings of Anthony Kenny, is actually directed at a Transfer-like principle, rather than Transfer itself. Fischer makes some cogent points in response to Kenny, but I shall pass them over here because Kenny's argument, though often cited, is rather weak. The second criticism taken up by Fischer (at much greater length) is that of Michael Slote (see 'Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem', *Journal of Philosophy* 79 (1982), pp. 5–24). Slote's strategy is to impugn Transfer indirectly by attempting to show its invalidity for modalities other than 'powerlessness' (or 'power necessity') and then to argue that the reason Transfer fails for these other modalities is equally applicable in the case of power necessity. The analogues adduced by Slote include knowledge ('epistemic necessity'), obligation, and 'non-accidentality'. After carefully discussing closure principles such as Transfer in reference to knowledge, Fischer focuses on the more plausibly relevant latter two examples. Slote begins by noting that these modalities have a *relational* character – a meeting of two friends is (non)accidental only relative to some specific plan or other. Slote further contends that they are also *selective* – there are restrictions on the way these 'necessities' can arise that invalidate the relevant version of Transfer (as well as closure under conjunction introduction and logical implication). For example, a plan may call for X, X may require Y, but the plan may not call for Y – for it need not call for all it presupposes (Fischer, pp. 38–9). Slote then contends that there is a similar selectivity in the case of power necessity (or 'unavoidability'):

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when we say of any past event that we can *now* do nothing about it, I think we are saying that our *present* desires, abilities, beliefs, characters, etc., are no part of the explanation of it . . . the particular kind of factor in relation to which unavoidability exists at any given time . . . is simply, some factor . . . that brings about the unavoidable thing *without making use of (an explanatory chain that includes) the desires, etc., the agent has around that time.*

(quoted in Fischer, p. 39)

This is applied to the argument for incompatibilism by alleging that even though facts about the past and the laws of nature are now unavoidable for me, the present action which is their logical consequence need not be, since the selectivity of unavoidability invalidates the unrestricted application of Transfer. Since these factors give rise to my action via a causal chain that includes my desires, etc., they do not render it unavoidable.

Fischer makes several points in responding to Slote's argument: I will here focus on the two main responses. First, he argues that it cannot be necessary (as Slote's analysis implies) for an action to be unavoidable that there exists no explanation of it that refers to the agent's motivational states at the time of its performance. For all *actions* admit of such an explanation, and yet there are unfree actions. However, one worries that this merely invites a fine-tuning of Slote's selectivity-generating feature. Fischer's more decisive criticism is that it is simply implausible to claim that unavoidability depends on selective factors such as particular acts of explanation or formations of plans, which obviously do not conform to closure principles due to the finitude of human agents. An act is (un)avoidable irrespective of the particular acts of explanation that are offered for it, and this point alone suffices to show the disanalogy to the other modalities noted (assuming one accepts Slote's selectivity analysis of the latter in the first place).

Note that this criticism may be accepted entirely independently of incompatibilist convictions. The compatibilist is simply sent looking elsewhere to impugn the plausibility of Transfer in application to power necessity. In a footnote at the end of the chapter, Fischer notes an apparent direct counterexample to such an application by David Widerker ('On an Argument for Incompatibilism', *Analysis* 47 (1987), pp. 37–41), and cites a couple of responses to it. This example (and others offered subsequently) warrant further attention than Fischer gives them. He notes that Widerker's example assumes an indeterministic scenario, and he suggests that one reply to it would be to restrict Transfer's application to deterministic contexts. But in addition to the objection that this reply is ad hoc, similar examples can be given that do not employ that feature. In a recent paper ('A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism', delivered to the 1995 Central Division Meetings of the APA), David Johnson and Thomas McKay establish that the sources of these counter-examples – and they are genuine ones – reside in the commitment of Transfer to closure under conjunction introduction, and the failure of the latter for one common rendering of the 'S is not free to perform action X' locution. (Assume a fair coin that happens to go unflipped at t_2 . S is not free at t_1 to act such that 'The coin does not land heads at t_2 ' is false, nor is S free at t_1 to act such that 'The coin does not land tails at t_2 ' is false, but S is free at t_1 to act such that 'The coin does not land heads and does not land tails at t_2 ' is false.) On this common rendering, S's freedom to falsify some true proposition requires S's possessing a *reliable* ability to bring about its falsity. Now it can be argued that a motivated, modified version of Transfer can be formulated that avoids this problem and does the original work. (Widerker himself suggested one such way in the paper cited above.) And Johnson and

McKay have shown that one can also simply strengthen the *interpretation* of the N operator such that $N_{st}(p)$ holds just in case p is true and S cannot act in such a way that it so much as *might* be that not p . (If $N_{st}(p)$ holds under this stronger interpretation, it will also hold under the weaker, more ordinary interpretation.) But there is much to be said here about the logic of unavoidability, and the interested reader will have to go elsewhere to pursue this important issue.

Having argued that it is at least highly plausible that causal determinism is inconsistent with an agent's being able to do otherwise, Fischer proceeds to elaborate a line of argument first advanced by Harry Frankfurt that such an ability is not necessary for one to be morally responsible for one's actions and their consequences. This argument draws on examples in which an agent acts entirely of his own accord and yet there is a person waiting 'in the wings' who monitors the agent's deliberation via some suitably ingenious device and is disposed to intervene and cause the agent to pursue some particular course of action, should the agent be inclined to do otherwise. As it happens, the agent chooses the desired action independently. Fischer notes that some have argued that while such examples show that responsibility is compatible with a greatly *restricted* range of alternative possibilities, none of them succeed in giving an example of a responsible action to which there are *no* alternatives. For if one individuates alternatives in a fine-grained fashion, there will always be available a state of affairs of some such type as, 'Agent S *begins* to deliberate differently'. Fischer plausibly argues, though, that this may not be enough to re-establish the necessity of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility, since the finely individuated alternatives noted do not appear sufficiently robust to *ground* our judgements of responsibility. (He argues that it is not in virtue of such alternatives that we deem the agent responsible, since all such alternative scenarios involve the agent's ultimately acting *unfreely*.)

As I've said, Fischer's point here is quite plausible, taken simply as a reply to the defender of the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility. But it is also plausible to think that it is over-reaching to take Frankfurt-type scenarios to show (as Fischer does) that a drastic revision of our conception of responsible agency is called for. For Frankfurt scenarios are very extraordinary, and probably entirely non-actual. And prior to thinking about such unusual scenarios, we have quite strong intuitions that the availability of alternative possibilities *are* required for responsibility. So even if one is willing to grant that alternative possibilities are not a strictly necessary condition on responsibility, they ought not to lead one to completely revise our conception of what moral responsibility requires *under ordinary circumstances*. That is, while alternative possibilities may not be strictly necessary for responsibility, generally, it's plausible to think that they are necessary *conditionally* – conditional on there being no latent 'counterfactual interveners'. Philosophers want to know about the strictly necessary conditions, of course, but whatever those necessary conditions are, it is plausible that they will entail the presence of alternative possibilities in ordinary cases.

I now turn briefly to Fischer's own positive account of responsible agency, developed in chapter 8. Fischer suggests that responsibility for an action requires only 'weak reasons-responsiveness' – where this amounts to there being some possible world (sharing the causal laws of the actual world) in which there is a 'sufficient reason' to do otherwise, the deliberative 'mechanism' issuing in the action in the actual case is operative, and the agent does otherwise (p. 166). His development of this account is fairly sketchy, and he concedes that it requires further fine-tuning to handle cases such as those of mentally unstable agents that exhibit a very low

level of responsiveness to reasons. I believe he is insufficiently impressed by worries of a more basic sort connected to how we are to individuate 'mechanisms' in this context. For analogous worries about the mechanisms appealed to by reliability theories in epistemology (see Richard Foley, 'What's Wrong With Reliabilism?', *The Monist* 68 (1985), pp. 188–202). But this is best assessed in the context of Fischer's forthcoming sequel to the present book (co-authored with Mark Ravizza) in which his basic account is more fully elaborated.

Let me end this review by adding that Fischer draws connections to several topics that were not mentioned above – for example, he discusses a Transfer-like closure principle used in arguments for skepticism in chapter 2, and provides penetrating analysis of Newcomb's problem and the hard/soft fact distinction in the context of divine foreknowledge in chapters 5 and 6, respectively. This is a rich book, one that is warmly commended to all with an interest in conceptual issues connected to the notions of freedom of will and moral responsibility.

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Identification Papers

By Diana Fuss

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Contemporary continental philosophy, with its penchant for anti-foundationalist approaches to the human sciences and deep suspicion of scientific discourses in general, often finds itself returning to the writings of Sigmund Freud and the early history of psychoanalysis for an understanding of identity formation. Placed within the context of contemporary continental philosophy, culture studies, and feminist theory, Diana Fuss's recent book addresses the important issues concerning the philosophical, political, and psychological intricacies of the process of identification in postmodern society.

Identification Papers begins with an appropriate intermingling of the writings of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. Freud, from *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis*, presents identification as a negotiation between the subject and the lost love-object. Lacan, from *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, simplifies identification even further, taking it to be the process by which the outside is kept as an image of inside. Each of the inaugurating epigraphs anticipates Fuss's theme: '... identification is the detour through the other that defines a self' (p. 2). Fuss draws heavily from the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy in defining identification. She also includes the tradition of French Hegelianism in her theoretical approach – as it is shaped by such contemporary thinkers as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray, and Jacques Derrida.

While many of the book's chapters have been previously published as separate essays, *Identification Papers* has a constant set of concerns that move Fuss's writing across the history of psychoanalysis, film studies, the autobiographical fiction of Dorothy Strachey, and post-colonial studies. The first two chapters, for example, 'Identification Papers' and 'Fallen Women: the Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman', provide an overview of the development of identification within early psychoanalysis. Fuss revisits Freud's early correspondences with Wilhelm Fliess (the late 1890s) and gives a reading of the often overlooked case study of 1920, 'The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman'.